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We design a simple protocol of coalition formation. A society grows up by
sequentially incorporating new members. The negotiations are always bilat-
eral. We study this protocol in the context of non-transferable utility (NTU)
games in characteristic function form. When the corresponding NTU game
(N,V) satisﬁes that V (N) is ﬂat, the only payoﬀ which arises in equilibrium
is the Shapley NTU value.
Keywords: Shapley NTU value, subgame perfect equilibrium, sequential
formation of coalitions.1 Introduction
Endogenous formation of coalitions has been widely studied in the literature.
A common approach is to assume that many players can simultaneously join
a coalition. For example, Hart and Kurz (1983), Chatterjee et al. (1993),
Bloch (1996), Okada (1996), and Ray and Vohra (1999) consider situations
where coalitions form and leave the game.
Ad i ﬀerent approach is to assume that only bilateral mergers occur, and
the new created coalitions keep merging among themselves until a stable
coalition structure is created. This is the approach followed by Gul (1989)
and Macho-Stadler et al. (2002).
Following the latter approach, this paper studies situations in which a so-
ciety is formed by the sequential incorporation of new members. In contrast
with previous models, the collusion is not parallel. Instead, a size-increasing
coalition arises swallowing other individuals, like a snowball. An individual
agent may only join this coalition or remain single. International treaties
such like the European Union or the NATO provide relevant examples of
this coalition formation protocol. In the case of the European Union, since
the custom convention between Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands
enters into force (1948), until the current negotiations with Eastern and
Central Europe candidates, one refoundation (1951) and four additional en-
largements (1973, 1981, 1986 and 1995) have taken place. Even thought
more than a country oﬃcially joined the Union at the same time, the process
of negotiation was individual for each candidate and independent from each
other. Thus, in practice, it can be considered that the countries joined the
union sequentially. Moreover, accession of new members may cause a change
in the laws which rule the society. In the next scheduled enlargement (due
to happen in 2004), the old voting system, used in a Union of 15, becomes
obsolete and should be changed for a Union of 25. In any case, a change in
the laws requires the unanimity of all members. Refusal from any current
member may abort the enlargement. In 2001, people in Ireland voted in
referendum against the Treaty of Niza, putting in jeopardy all the process of
1enlargement. In a second referendum (held in 2002), the Irish people voted
in favour.
Another example of a society being formed by sequential entry of new
members is given by situations in which a big company grows up by buying
smaller companies, like Microsoft’s policy in the second half of the nineties.
Frequently, this enlargement is directed to new business ﬁelds and implies a
change in the policy of the new enlarged company.
In this paper, we model this process in the set of NTU games by a simple
mechanism of negotiation. The main idea of the mechanism is the creation
and further enlargement of a union or society of players. The members of
this society agree on a rule to share their resources. Players outside the
society can apply to enter the society by agreeing on the established internal
rule. However, in the admission negotiation, candidates may also propose to
change the internal rule on entrance. Moreover, unanimity is required among
every member of the society to change the rules.
We study the subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) payoﬀso ft h e
above mechanism1. In a particular class of games, the Shapley NTU value
(Shapley, 1969; see also Aumann, 1985) arises in equilibrium. This provides
further support to this value.
Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) designed a non-cooperative mechanism such
that the consistent value (Maschler and Owen, 1989 and 1992) arises in
subgame perfect Nash equilibria. As far as we know, no similar result has
been obtained for other extensions of the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) and
the Nash solution (Nash, 1950) to NTU games, such like the Harsanyi value
(Harsanyi, 1963) or the Shapley NTU value.
The particular class of games we should restrict ourselves to are games
(N,V) such that V (N) is delimited by a hyperplane. This class includes the
transfer utility (TU) games; but it also includes some proper NTU games,
for example, prize games (Hart, 1994). Another example with pure exchange
1We use the term non-cooperative mechanism instead of non-cooperative game in order
to avoid confusion with cooperative games.
2economies is analyzed in Section 4.2 following a simple idea: when the grand
coalition forms, the exchange economy is big enough for agents to have unlim-
ited liability. However, when few agents are involved, they may have limited
liability, so that a transfer of utility (money) may not be always possible.
In Section 2, we present the notation. In Section 3, we present the mech-
anism and the main results. In Section 4, we analyze several examples. In
Section 5, we prove the results.
2 Preliminaries
Let R be the set of real numbers. Similarly, R++ and R+ are the set of
positive and nonnegative real numbers, respectively. Given any ﬁnite set S,
we denote by |S| the cardinality of S,a n db yRS the set of all functions
from S to R. The sets RS
++ and RS
+ are deﬁned accordingly. We also denote
by 2S the cardinal set of S, i.e. 2S := {T : T ⊂ S}.A m e m b e r x of RS is
an |S|-dimensional vector whose coordinates are indexed by members of S;
thus, when i ∈ S,w ew r i t exi for x(i).I fx ∈ RT (or x ∈ RN)a n dT ⊂ S
(or T ⊂ N), we write xT for the restriction of x to T, i.e. the members of
RT whose ith coordinate is xi. With some abuse of notation, given x ∈ RS
and a ∈ R,w ew r i t e(x,a) ∈ RS∪{i} for the member of RS∪{i} whose ith
coordinate is a and whose restriction to S is x.G i v e n x,y ∈ RS,w ew r i t e
x ≥ y if xi ≥ yi for all i ∈ S.
Let N = {1,2,...,n} be a ﬁnite set of players.N o n - e m p t y s u b s e t s o f
N are called coalitions.A non-transferable utility (NTU) game on N is a
correspondence V that assigns to each coalition S as u b s e tV (S) ⊂ RS
satisfying the following properties:
(A1) For each S ⊂ N, the set V (S) is nonempty, closed, convex, compre-
hensive (i.e., if x ∈ V (S) and y ≤ x,t h e ny ∈ V (S)), and bounded
above (i.e., for each x ∈ RS,t h es e t{y ∈ V (S):y ≥ x} is compact).
(A2) Normalization:F o re a c h i ∈ N,t h em a x i m u mo f{x : x ∈ V ({i})},
which we denote by ωi, is nonnegative.
3Figure 1: Valid examples.
(A3) Zero-Monotonicity:F o re a c hS ⊂ N, x ∈ V (S) and i/ ∈ S,w eh a v e
(x,ωi) ∈ V (S ∪ {i}). In particular, this implies that (ωi)i∈S ∈ RS
belongs to V (S).
(A4) The boundary of V (N), which we denote by ∂V (N),i sn o n l e v e li n
the positive orthant (i.e., at any point of ∂V (N) ∩ RN
+ there exists an
outward vector with positive coordinates.)
(A5) For each S ⊂ N,i fx ∈ ∂V (S) with xi < 0 for i ∈ T,t h e n∂V (S) at
x is parallel to the subspace RT.
Properties (A1), (A2), (A3), and (A4) are standard properties. The nor-
malization given in (A2) does not aﬀect our results. Property (A4) has been
previously used by Hart and Mas-Colell (1996, in hypothesis (A2), page 359)
and Serrano (1997, in assumption A4, page 61). The hypothesis in Hart and
Mas-Colell (1996) is stronger, since it requires nonlevelness in every coalition
S ⊂ N.P r o p e r t y( A 5 )i sm a d es ot h a ta l lr e l e v a n ta c t i o no c c u r si nt h ep o s i -
tive orthant, and generalizes the property given in assumption A4 in Serrano
(1997). See Figures 1 and 2 for some examples.
A transfer utility (TU) game on N is a function v :2 S → R that assigns
to each coalition S ar e a ln u m b e rv(S) and v(∅)=0 .AT Ug a m ev on N











4Figure 2: The ﬁrst example does not satisfy (A4). The second and the third
do not satisfy (A5).
for all S ⊂ N.
Let Π be the set of all orders of players in N.G i v e nπ ∈ Π and i ∈ N,
we deﬁne Pπ
i as the set of players who come before i in the order π,n a m e l y
P
π
i := {j ∈ N : π(j) <π(i)}.
For notational convenience, we denote Pπ
n+1 := N.
Let v be a TU game on N and let π ∈ Π.G i v e n i ∈ N,w ed e ﬁne the
marginal contribution of player i under the order π in the game v as
v(P
π
i ∪ {i}) − v(P
π
i ) ∈ R.
The Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) of a TU game v on N is the vector








i ∪ {i}) − v(P
π
i )] ∈ R.
Let λ ∈ RN
++ and let S ⊂ N.W ed e ﬁne
v




λixi : x ∈ V (S)
)
.
Under our hypothesis, this supremum is a maximum:





















By (A1), B is bounded above and, by (A5), so is A. We will show that
supA =s u pB. Clearly, supA ≥ supB.L e tx ∈ V (S) and let x+ ∈ RS be
deﬁned by x
+






i .T h u s , supA ≤ supB.S i n c e B is compact, we
conclude that there exists maxB.
Av e c t o rx ∈ V (N) is a Shapley NTU value (Shapley, 1969) of V if there
exists a vector λ ∈ RN
++ such that λixi = Shi
¡
N,vλ¢
for all i ∈ N.E v e n
though the Shapley NTU value may not be unique, Shapley (1969) points out
that “it is suﬃcient [for uniqueness to hold] that the Pareto surface coincide
with a hyperplane within the individually rational zone”. We will refer to this
property later (see Theorem 2 below) as V (N) be delimited by a hyperplane.
Of course, the vector λ ∈ RN
++ is outward to the hyperplane.
Players will negotiate to form a society, and their payoﬀ will only depend
on the identity of its members. Thus, we deﬁne a rule as a function γ which
assigns to each coalition S a vector γ (S) ∈ V (S).F o r m a l l y , a r u l e i s a
“payoﬀ conﬁguration” (see Hart and Mas-Colell, 1996). However, a rule
should not be interpreted as a payoﬀ for every coalition, but as an index that
indicates the payoﬀ when a particular society is formed. We denote by Γ the
set of all rules.
3 The non-cooperative mechanism
Players should form a society. First, an order of the players is randomly
chosen. Assume the order is π =( 1 2 ...n).P l a y e r 1 should then present a
rule γ ∈ Γ. No restrictions (apart from feasibility) are imposed on γ.P l a y e r
2 may either agree on γ and join the society, or disagree on γ and propose a
6new rule e γ to player 1.I fp l a y e r1 accepts (he votes ‘yes’), the society {1,2}
forms with the new rule e γ, and turn passes to player 3.I f p l a y e r 2 rejects
(he votes ‘no’), he remains out of the society and turn passes to player 3.
In general, when the turn reaches player i, he faces a society S ⊂ Pπ
i with
certain rule γ, and a set of players E = Pπ
i \S w h oh a v ec h o s e nt os t a yo u t
of the society. Players in S, E and N\Pπ
i are called active players, passive
players and candidates, respectively. Player i must then either agree to join
the society (in that case, player i becomes an active player and turn passes
to candidate i +1 ) or disagree and propose both a new rule e γ and a new
society e S ⊂ Pπ
i ∪ {i} which includes himself and all the members of the old
society (i.e. S ∪{i} ⊂ e S). The members of e S\{i} vote sequentially whether
they accept or reject this proposal. If all of them vote ‘yes’, the new society
e S forms with the new rule (we say then that the proposal is accepted), and
turn passes to candidate i +1 .I fa tl e a s to n em e m b e ro fe S\{i} votes ‘no’,
player i becomes a passive player and turn passes to candidate i +1 .
Once there are no more candidates, we have a society S ⊂ N of active
players, a set E = N\S of passive players, and a rule γ for the society. Then,
the ﬁnal payoﬀ for each player i ∈ S is γi (S) and every player i ∈ E receives
his individual payoﬀ ωi.
We now describe the mechanism M formally. We ﬁrst describe the games
M (π,i,S,E,γ) and f M (π,i,S,E,γ). M (π,i,S,E,γ) is the subgame which
begins when, given the order π, turn reaches player i and he faces a society
of active players S with a proposed rule γ ∈ Γ, and a set of passive players
E such that S ∪ E = Pπ
i and S ∩ E = ∅. f M (π,i,S,E,γ) is the subgame
which arises after player i disagrees in the subgame M (π,i,S,E,γ).
Let π ∈ Π be an order of the players. We can assume without
loss of generality that π =( 1 2 ...n).G i v e ni ∈ N ∪{n +1 }, γ ∈ Γ
and S,E ⊂ Pπ
i such that S ∪ E = Pπ
i and S ∩ E = ∅, we induc-
tively deﬁne the mechanisms M (π,i,S,E,γ) and f M (π,i,S,E,γ)
as follows.
In both M (π,n+1 ,S,E,γ) and f M (π,n+1 ,S,E,γ),e v e r yp l a y e r
7i ∈ S receives γi (S) and every player i ∈ E receives ωi.
Assume both M (π,j,S0,E0,γ0) and f M (π,j,S0,E0,γ0) are deﬁned
for all j>i , γ0 ∈ Γ and S0,E0 such that S0 ∪ E0 = Pπ
j and
S0 ∩ E0 = ∅.
In f M (π,i,S,E,γ),p l a y e ri proposes a rule e γ ∈ Γ and sets e S ⊃ S
and e E ⊂ E such that i ∈ e S, e S ∪ e E = Pπ
i ∪ {i} and e S ∩ e E = ∅.
If all the members of e S\{i} vote ‘yes’ (they are asked in some
prespeciﬁed order) then the mechanism M
³
π,i+1 , e S, e E,e γ
´
is
played. If at least one member of e S\{i} votes ‘no’, the mechanism
M (π,i+1 ,S,E∪ {i},γ) is played.
In M (π,i,S,E,γ),p l a y e ri can either agree or disagree on (S,E,γ).
If he disagrees, then f M (π,i,S,E,γ) is played. If he agrees, then
M (π,i+1 ,S∪ {i},E,γ) is played.
The mechanism M consists of choosing randomly an order π0 ∈ Π,
being each order equally likely to be chosen, and playing the game
M (π0): =f M (π0,i 0,∅,∅,γ0),w h e r eπ0 (i0)=1 .
Clearly, for any set of pure (mixed) strategies, this mechanism terminates
in ﬁnite time. Thus, the (expected) payoﬀsa tt e r m i n a t i o na r ew e l l - d e ﬁned.
We will also assume that, if a player is indiﬀerent to agreeing or rejecting an
oﬀer, he strictly prefers to agree. This assumption is made in order to avoid
problems of coordination among players. In Section 4.3 we show that this
tie-breaking rule is needed in our model. Note that we do not need to make
any assumption when players sequentially vote ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to a proposal in
the subgames f M.
Theorem 2 If V (N) is delimited by a hyperplane, then there exists a unique
expected subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) payoﬀ in the negotiation
mechanism M, and it is the Shapley NTU value. Furthermore, the strategy of
ap l a y e ri nS P N Ei nt h en e g o t i a t i o nm e c h a n i s mM (π) for any π are robust
to deviations by coalitions of his predecessors in π.
8The proof of Theorem 2 is located in the Appendix. The main idea of
the proof is that, given any order π, each player has a strategy that ensures
him his marginal contribution in the order π. Thus, in expected terms, the
ﬁnal payoﬀ is the Shapley NTU value.
Theorem 3 The negotiation mechanism M implements the Shapley value
in zero-monotonic TU games.
The proof of Theorem 3 is located in the Appendix.
4S o m e e x a m p l e s
4.1 A classical example
In this section we apply the above procedure to an exchange economy which
appeared in a series of papers in Econometrica in the 80’s discussing the
applicability of the Shapley NTU value. The reader is referred to Roth
(1980), Shafer (1980), Harsanyi (1980), Aumann (1985b), Roth (1986), and
Aumann (1986). This controversy has been recently revisited in Montero
and Okada (2003).
Example 4 (Shafer, 1980) Consider a pure exchange economy with three




1 =( 1 − ε,0)
z
0




and utility functions are given by
u1 (x,y)=m i n {x,y}





9Commodities x and y may be considered as ‘left gloves’ and ‘right gloves’,
respectively. Players 1 and 2 only get utility from pairs of gloves. However,
player 3 only uses the leather of the gloves. Let i denote an element in {1,2}.
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.









discussion of this result, the reader is referred to Shafer (1980), Roth (1980)
and Aumann (1980).
The TU game associated to this example is given by λ =( 1 ,1,1) and
vλ ({i})=0 , vλ ({3})=ε, vλ ({1,2})=1− ε, vλ ({i,3})=( 1+ε)/2,a n d
v(N)=1(see Figure 1.) In the order π = (312), a possible equilibrium in
the bargaining mechanism would proceed as follows: players 3 and 1 propose
ar u l eγ that satisﬁes γ (N) = ((1 − ε)/2,(1 − ε)/2,ε) — i.e. the vector of
marginal contributions in the order π —a n dγ ({1,3}) = ((1 − ε)/2,−,ε).
Player 2 cannot hope to suggest a more proﬁtable outcome to himself. In
fact, players 1 and 3 are indiﬀerent to player 2 joining them or not. Player 2
accepts the oﬀer and the ﬁnal payoﬀ is γ (N).
A s s u m en o ww ea r ei nt h eN T Ug a m eo ft h ee x a m p l e . P l a y e r s3 and 1
cannot propose a rule satisfying γ ({1,3})=( ( 1− ε)/2,−,ε), because this
payoﬀ is unfeasible for them. It is as if they wanted to make a non-credible
threat to player 2 in case he does not join them.
However, they can still propose γ (N) = ((1 − ε)/2,(1 − ε)/2,ε) and
γ ({1,3})=( 0 ,−,(1 + ε)/2).T h i sm e a n st h a t





Figure 3: Feasible outcomes for {1,2} and {i,3}.
with x1 = y1 =( 1− ε)/2,p l a y e r2 receives commodities (x2,y 2) with
x2 = y2 =( 1− ε)/2,a n dp l a y e r3 keeps his initial endowment; and
• in case player 2 does not join them, they threat to form a society in
{1,3} in which player 3 receives all their commodities (i.e. (x3,y 3) with
x3 =1and y3 = ε), and player 1 receives nothing.
In this case, the threat is credible, because this allocation is feasible for
{1,3}.A g a i n ,p l a y e r2 cannot suggest a more proﬁtable outcome to himself.
Any feasible proposal giving him more than (1 − ε)/2 w o u l dr e s u l ti ni tb e i n g
rejected by player 1 or 2. This means that, in equilibrium, player 2 would
directly agree to join the society. Note that, in this case, players 1 and 3 are
not indiﬀerent to player 2 joining them or not.
4.2 An example with farmers and Factories
Consider a pure exchange economy where big Factories acquire products
from farmers, who have limited liability. Suppose that a planner (e.g. the
government) would like to favor the productivity of the farmers, avoiding the
factories to take advantage of farmers’ lack of liability. Our analysis shows
11that this handicap can be avoided by forcing the proposed mechanism. The
Shapley NTU value, as opposed to other values, such like the Harsanyi value
and the consistent value, provide all agents (both farmers and Factories)
with the Shapley value of the game which arises from the economy when a
common utility is freely transferable.
The next example is an adaptation of the game presented by Owen (1972).
It has also been used by Hart and Kurz (1983) and Hart and Mas-Colell
(1996):
Example 5 Consider a pure exchange economy with three players {1,2,3}
and three commodities {x,y1,y 2}. Initial endowments are given by:
z
0
1 =( 0 ,1,0)
z
0
2 =( 0 ,0,1)
z
0
3 =( 1 ,0,0)
and utility functions are given by
u1 (x,y1,y 2)=x +m i n{y1,y 2}




u3 (x,y1,y 2)=x +m i n{y1,y 2} − 1.
Thus, commodity x (money) is additive and linear in every player’s utility
function. Commodities y1 and y2 may be considered as ‘left gloves’ and ‘right
gloves’, respectively. Players only get utility from pairs of gloves. However,
player 2 does not have as much production (or selling) ability as the rest of
the players. If players had unlimited liability, players 1 and 2 could agree on


















However, if we consider only nonnegative commodities, the above con-





{i} : t ≤ 0
ª
for all i ∈ {1,2,3}
V ({1,2})=
½
(t1,t 2) ∈ R






(ti,t 3) ∈ R
{i,3} : ti + t3 ≤ 0,t i ≤ 1,t 3 ≤ 0
ª
for all i ∈ {1,2}
V ({1,2,3})=
½
(t1,t 2,t 3) ∈ R
{1,2,3} : t1 + t2 + t3 ≤ 1,t 1 ≤ 2,t 2 ≤
5
4
,t 3 ≤ 1
¾
.
Thus, player 3 (the banker) is needed as a catalyst. Players 1 and 2 may
then agree to share part of their resources (pair of gloves) with player 3 in
exchange of his services.







.F o re x -
ample, players 1 and 2 sell their gloves to player 3 at a exchange rate of 5
pairs for 4 currency units.







,i . e . s i n c e
player 2 has the low production ability, he is the one who has to pay to player
3.






.F o re x a m -
ple, players 1 and 2 sell their gloves to player 3 at a exchange rate of 1 pair
for 1 currency unit. Notice that this payoﬀ is the same players would have
agreed upon player 1 should initially have enough money.







is not attainable without him), he must receive more
than 0. However, player 3 does not contribute with any additional production
capability. He just provides the other players with money so that trade may
freely happen. We may want to incentive the production of goods and not the
lending of money. Thus, player 3 should not get proﬁtf r o mt h es i m p l ef a c t
to have money when others do not have it. In this context, the Shapley NTU
v a l u es e e m sam u c hf a i r e ra l l o c a t i o n .
In our pure exchange economy, two conditions must hold:
1. The farmers have limited liability. The Factories have unlimited liabil-
ity.
132. Production in Factories at least as eﬃcient as in farms. Thus, it is
optimal (in the sense of maximizing aggregate utility) for the Factories
to hold all the non-monetary commodities.
The ﬁrst condition implies that the farmers may be in an inferior position
with respect to the Factories. If every player had unlimited liability, we would
be in a transfer utility (TU) context, and our mechanism would implement
the Shapley value. In Example 4, players 1 and 2 play the role of farmers,
and player 3 is the Factory.
The second condition implies that the farms produce not for domestic
consumption, but for selling to the Factories. Eﬃciency may be achieved by
assigning all the commodities, but money, to the Factories. In example 4,










,z 3 =( 0 ,1,1), which held the
Shapley NTU value, maximize the aggregate utility and give player 3 (the
Factory) all the gloves.
We present the model more formally. Let {Nf,N F} be a partition of N.
We say that the members of Nf are farmers and the members of NF are
Factories.W ec o n s i d e rl commodities.
Properties 1 and 2 are formally stated as follows:
1. A consumption zi for player i ∈ Nf (resp. NF)i sap a i r(xi,y i) such
that xi ∈ R+ (resp. R)a n dyi ∈ R
l−1
+ .P l a y e r i ∈ N is characterized




+ and a utility function ui :
Rl
+ → R (if i ∈ NF, ui : R × R
l−1
+ → R)s u c ht h a tui (zi)=xi +ˆ ui (yi)
for some continuous, nondecreasing function ˆ ui : R
l−1
+ → R satisfying
ˆ ui (y0
i) ≥ 0 (this is a normalization condition made to ﬁt( A 2 )b u ti t
has no more consequences).
Notice that the additivity separability and linearity in xi of ui permits
utility transfers among players. However, the nonnegativeness of xi when
i ∈ Nf restricts these transfers when farmers are involved (they have limited
liability).








(zi)i∈S : zi ∈ R
l
+∀i ∈ Nf ∩ S,zi ∈ R × R
l−1











2 .T h e r ee x i s t sayM ∈ R
l−1
+ with yM













ˆ ui (yi):( x,y) ∈ Ω




Under these conditions, we have the following result:
Theorem 6 The negotiation mechanism M implements the NTU Shapley
value in pure exchange economies which satisfy conditions 1 and 2.
The proof of Theorem 6 is similar to those of Theorem 2 and we omit it.
4.3 The tie-breaking rule
Assume the tie-breaking rule does not hold. Then, the Shapley NTU value
is still an equilibrium outcome. However, another equilibrium payoﬀsm a y
arise, as the next example shows.
Example 7 Let N = {1,2,3,4} and let v be the deﬁned by v(S)=1if
{1,2,3} ⊂ S and v(S)=0otherwise, i.e. the game v is the unanimity game
with carrier {1,2,3} and 4 as null player. Let π = (1234).I nt h i se x a m p l e ,
the vector of marginal contributions in the order π is dπ =( 0 ,0,1,0).W e
consider the following strategies for players in the order π: Players {1,2}
propose a rule γ satisfying γ ({1,2})=( 1 ,−1), γ ({1,2,4})=( −1,1,0) and
γ (N)=( 0 ,1,0,0).P l a y e r 4,w h e nf a c i n gas o c i e t yS = {1,2} a n das e t
of passive players E = {3} with a rule γ such that γ4 ({1,2,4})=0 ,w o u l d
use the following tie-breaking rule: If player 3 was excluded after proposing
15e γ with e γ1 (N) ≥ e γ2 (N),t h e np l a y e r4 agrees to join the society2.I fp l a y e r3
was excluded after proposing e γ with e γ1 (N) < e γ2 (N),t h e np l a y e r4 disagrees
and proposes an unacceptable oﬀer, for example (0,0,0,1).
These strategies can be supported as part of an equilibrium. Player 3
agrees because he cannot hope to propose a positive payoﬀ to himself. If he
disagrees and proposes e γ with e γ1 (N) ≥ e γ2 (N),t h e np l a y e r2 would get 1 by
voting ‘no’. This means that e γ is not accepted unless e γ1 (N) ≥ e γ2 (N) ≥ 1,
which leaves player 3 with a negative payoﬀ.I fp l a y e r3 disagrees and proposes
e γ with e γ1 (N) < e γ2 (N),t h e np l a y e r1 would get 1 by voting ‘no’. Again, this
means that e γ is not accepted unless e γ2 (N) > e γ1 (N) ≥ 1.
Vidal-Puga and Bergantiños (2003) model this tie-breaking rule by “pun-
ishing” with a small penalty ε>0 the players involved in an exclusion. In our
model, this means that any excluded player i would get an utility of almost
(but strictly less than) ωi. The mechanism would also work if we restrict
ourselves to strict zero-monotonic games, i.e. for each S ⊂ N, x ∈ V (S) and
i/ ∈ S,t h ep a y o ﬀ (x,ωi) belongs to the interior of V (S ∪ {i}).
5A p p e n d i x
5.1 Proof of Theorem 2
The proof is structured as follows: First, we introduce some additional no-
tation. Second, we construct a SPNE that yields the Shapley NTU value.
Third, we prove that any SPNE yields the Shapley NTU value as expected
outcome.
2For simplicity, we assume that player 3 makes an acceptable oﬀer to player 4 (i.e.
e γ4 (N)=0 ). A more precise description of player 4’s strategy is given in Section 5.3.
165.1.1 Additional notation
Let (λi)i∈N ∈ RN














In order to prove Theorem 2, we need some additional notation. Given
x ∈ RS,w ed e ﬁne x+ ∈ RS
+ as the vector whose coordinates are given by
x
+
i := max{0,x i} for all i ∈ S.B y( A 5 ) ,x ∈ V (S) implies x+ ∈ V (S) for
all S ⊂ N.
Let π ∈ Π. From now on, we assume without loss of generality that
π =( 1 2 ...n). In particular, this implies that Pπ
i+1 = Pπ
i ∪ {i} for all i ∈ N.
Let λidπ
i be the marginal contribution of player i to the game vλ in the



















Given x ∈ RPπ
i ,w ed e ﬁne
f
π











when this maximum exists. In particular, if x ∈ V (Pπ
i ), this value is well-
deﬁned and nonnegative.
Note that fπ
i (x) represents the maximum payoﬀ that player i can obtain
when the players before him get x and the players after him get dπ.
Lemma 8 Let x ∈ RPπ
i be such that fπ




























∈ ∂V (N).B y( A 5 ) ,fπ




























,( 2 )h o l d s .
Given S 6= N,w ed e ﬁne
κ(S): =m i n
©





Thus, players in Pπ
κ(S) are the ﬁrst players out of S who come together in
the order π. This minimum always exists, because Pπ















for all S Ã N
o
where γ+ (S) is such that γ
+






for all i ∈ S.
Thus, Γπ is the set of (positive) rules which do not share the resources
of the players after the ﬁrst ‘gap’ in the coalition (with respect to π). Note









π : γ (P
π










This Kπ is the set of rules out of Γπ which give each coalition Pπ
i the
payoﬀ x that minimizes fπ
i (x). The next lemma provides an alternative
deﬁnition for Kπ.
Lemma 9 Kπ =
n
























































i ) ∈ argminx∈V(Pπ
i ) {fπ
i (x)} iﬀ fπ
i (γ (Pπ
i )) = dπ

































18We denote by Θπ




i := {(S,E,γ):S ∪ E = P
π
i ,S∩ E = ∅ and γ ∈ Γ}.
5.1.2 Existence of equilibria
Given any (S,E,γ) ∈ Θπ
n+1,w ed e ﬁne
b(n +1 ,S,E,γ): =( γ (S),ωE) ∈ V (N).
Thus, b(n +1 ,S,E,γ) is the ﬁnal payoﬀin the subgame M (π,n+1 ,S,E,γ).
Consider the following strategies in the subgames M (π,n,S,E,γ) and
f M (π,n,S,E,γ):
In the subgame M (π,n,S,E,γ),p l a y e rn agrees on (S,E,γ) if and only
if
γn (S ∪ {n}) ≥ f
π
n (γ (S),ω E),
which can be restated as





n (n +1 ,S,E∪ {n},γ)
¢
. (3)
In the subgame f M (π,n,S,E,γ),p l a y e rn proposes
³
e S, e E,e γ
´
such that
e S = N, e E = ∅ and
e γ (N)=( t,f
π
n (t)) (4)






















19Clearly, e γ ∈ Kπ. In the subgame f M (π,n,S,E,γ), assume player n pro-
poses
³
˜ S, ˜ E,˜ γ
´
and j ∈ ˜ S\{n}. Then, player j votes ‘yes’ if and only if
bj
³
n +1 , ˜ S, ˜ E,˜ γ
´
≥ bj (n +1 ,S,E∪ {n},γ). (7)
Thus, we have deﬁned the strategies of the players in M (π,n,S,E,γ)
for any (S,E,γ) ∈ Θπ
n.L e tb(n,S,E,γ) ∈ V (N) be the ﬁnal payoﬀ in the
subgame M (π,n,S,E,γ) when players follow these strategies. This payoﬀ
is well-deﬁned. Moreover, next claims apply. Claim I will imply that every
player agrees on the oﬀers. Claim II speciﬁes the ﬁnal payoﬀ when there is a
disagreement. Claim III and Claim VI are technical ones. Claim IV says that
every player receives at least dπ. Claim V says that passive players receive
nothing.
Claim I(n): Assume we are in M (π,n,Pπ
n,∅,γ) such that γn (N)=dπ
n
and γ ∈ Kπ. Then, under these strategies, player n agrees.
Proof. We need to prove that (3) is satisﬁed.
bn (n +1 ,P
π













































Claim II(n): Assume we are in f M (π,n,S,E,γ). Then, under these
strategies, the ﬁnal payoﬀis given by (t,fπ
n (t)) with t = bPπ
n (n +1 ,S,E∪ {n},γ).
Proof. Notice ﬁrst that fπ
n (t) is well-deﬁned because
bPπ





e S, e E,e γ
´
be player n’s proposal. This means that e S = N, e E = ∅
and e γ is given as in (4), (5) and (6).




n +1 , e S, e E,e γ
´
= bj (n +1 ,N,∅,e γ)=e γj (N)=bj (n +1 ,S,E∪ {n},γ).
Claim III(n): Assume we are in M (π,n,S,E,γ). Then, there exists a
T ⊃ S, E ∩ T = ∅ such that bS (n,S,E,γ)=γS (T).
Proof. If player n agrees, then
bS (n,S,E,γ)=bS (n +1 ,S∪ {n},E,γ)=γS (S ∪ {n})
and thus T = S ∪ {n}.
If player n disagrees, by Claim II(n),
bS (n,S,E,γ)=bS (n +1 ,S,E∪ {n},γ)=γ (S)
and thus T = S.
Claim IV(n): bn (n,S,E,γ) ≥ dπ
n for all (S,E,γ) ∈ Θπ
n.
Proof. Assume we are in the subgame M (π,n,S,E,γ).I f p l a y e r n







































If player n agrees, then by (3)






n (n +1 ,S,E∪ {n},γ)
¢
and we proceed as before.
Claim V(n): bE (n,S,E,γ)=ωE for each (S,E,γ) ∈ Θπ
n.
21Proof. Assume we are in the subgame M (π,n,S,E,γ).I f p l a y e r n
agrees, b(n,S,E,γ)=( γ (S ∪ {n}),ωE) and so the result holds. If player n





j (n,S,E,γ) ≤ vλ (S) for all (S,E,γ) ∈ Θπ
n.
Proof. Assume we are in M (π,n,S,E,γ).I f p l a y e r n disagrees, by
Claim II(n),
bS (n,S,E,γ)=bS (n +1 ,S,E∪ {n},γ)=γ (S).










j (S) ≤ v
λ (S).
If player n agrees,
b(n,S,E,γ)=b(n +1 ,S∪ {n},E,γ)=( γ (S ∪ {n}),ωE)
and (3) holds, i.e.









































































22Assume that for each j>iand each (S,E,γ) ∈ Θπ
j,w eh a v ed e ﬁned the
strategy proﬁles in M (π,j,S,E,γ) and f M (π,j,S,E,γ).L e tb(j,S,E,γ) ∈
V (N) betheﬁnal payoﬀwhen players follow these strategies in M (π,j,S,E,γ).
Furthermore, assume next claims hold:





such that γj (N)=
dπ
j for all j ≥ i +1and γ ∈ Kπ. Then, under these strategies, player i +1
agrees.
Claim II(i +1 ): Assume we are in f M (π,i+1 ,S,E,γ). Then, under









i+1 (i +2 ,S,E∪ {i +1 },γ).
Claim III(i +1 ): Assume we are in M (π,i+1 ,S,E,γ). Then, there
exists a T ⊃ S, E ∩ T = ∅ such that bS (i +1 ,S,E,γ)=γS (T).
Claim IV(i+1): bj (i +1 ,S,E,γ) ≥ dπ
j for all j ≥ i+1and all (S,E,γ) ∈
Θπ
i+1.
Claim V(i +1 ): bE (i +1 ,S,E,γ)=ωE for all (S,E,γ) ∈ Θπ
i+1.




j (i +1 ,S,E,γ) ≤ vλ (S) for all (S,E,γ) ∈
Θπ
i+1.
We now describe the strategies in M (π,i,S,E,γ) and f M (π,i,S,E,γ).
In M (π,i,S,E,γ),p l a y e ri agrees on (S,E,γ) if and only if





i (i +1 ,S,E∪ {i},γ)
¢
. (8)









≤ b(i +1 ,S,E∪ {i},γ) ∈ V (N)














The strategies in f M (π,i,S,E,γ) are as follows: Assume we are in the

















23with t = bPπ
i (i +1 ,S,E∪ {i},γ).I t i s n o t d i ﬃcult to check that e γ (N) is
well-deﬁned (i.e. e γ (N) ∈ V (N)). For T 6= N, e γ (T) is given as in (5) and
(6). Hence, e γ ∈ Kπ.
In the subgame f M (π,i,S,E,γ), assume player i proposes
³




i+1 and j ∈ ˜ S\{i}. Then, player j votes ‘yes’ if and only if
bj
³
i +1 , ˜ S, ˜ E,˜ γ
´
≥ bj (i +1 ,S,E∪ {i},γ). (10)
We need to prove the claims:
Claim I(i): Assume we are in M (π,i,Pπ
i ,∅,γ) such that γj (N)=dπ
j
for all j ≥ i,a n dγ ∈ Kπ. Then, under these strategies, player i agrees.
Proof. We need to prove that (8) holds. Given j>i , by Claim I(j),





.T h u s ,
bi (i +1 ,P
π
i ∪ {i},∅,γ)=γi (N)=d
π
i .
Moreover, by Claim III(i +1 ), there exists a T ⊃ Pπ
i , i/ ∈ T,s u c ht h a t
bPπ




which is γ (Pπ





































Claim II(i): Assume we are in f M (π,i,S,E,γ). Then, under these









with t = bPπ
i (i +1 ,S,E∪ {i},γ).
Proof. Let (Pπ
i ,∅,˜ γ) b eg i v e na si n( 9 ) ,( 5 )a n d( 6 ) .W en e e dt op r o v e
that player i’s proposal is accepted, i.e. that (10) holds for all j ∈ Pπ
i .B y
24Claim I(k) for all k ≥ i +1 , we know that each player k ≥ i +1is bound to
agree on (Pπ







= e γj (N)=bj (i +1 ,S,E∪ {i},γ)
for each j ∈ Pπ
i .
Claim III(i): Assume we are in M (π,i,S,E,γ). Then, there exists a
T ⊃ S, E ∩ T = ∅ such that bS (i,S,E,γ)=γS (T).
Proof. If player i agrees, by Claim III(i+1), bS∪{i} (i +1 ,S∪ {i},E,γ)=
γS∪{i} (T) with T ⊃ S ∪ {i} (thus T ⊃ S)a n dT ∩ E = ∅. Then,
bS (i,S,E,γ)=bS (i +1 ,S∪ {i},E,γ)=γS (T).
If player i disagrees, by Claim III(i+1), bS (i +1 ,S,E∪ {i},γ)=γS (T)
with T ⊃ S and T ∩ (E ∪ {i})=∅ (thus T ∩ E = ∅). Then, by Claim II(i),
bS (i,S,E,γ)=bS (i +1 ,S,E∪ {i},γ)=γS (T).
Claim IV(i): bj (i,S,E,γ) ≥ dπ
j for all j ≥ i and all (S,E,γ) ∈ Θπ
i .
Proof. Assume we are in the subgame M (π,i,S,E,γ).I fp l a y e ri dis-






i (i +1 ,S,E∪ {i},ωE)
¢
.
If player i agrees, by (8),






i (i +1 ,S,E∪ {i},γ)
¢
.






































































by zero-monotonicity, vλ (S)+
P
j∈E λjωj ≤ vλ(Pπ



















Claim V(i): bE (i,S,E,γ)=ωE for each (S,E,γ) ∈ Θπ
i .
Proof. Assume we are in the subgame M (π,i,S,E,γ) and let j ∈ E.I f
player i agrees, bj (i,S,E,γ)=bj (i +1 ,S∪ {i},E,γ),w h i c hi sωj by Claim
V(i +1 ). If player i disagrees, by Claim II(i),
bj (i,S,E,γ)=bj (i +1 ,S,E∪ {i},γ)





j (i,S,E,γ) ≤ vλ(S) for all (S,E,γ) ∈ Θπ
i .








i (i +1 ,S,E∪ {i},γ).










j (i +1 ,S,E∪ {i},γ) ≤ v
λ (S).
If player i agrees,
b
+ (i,S,E,γ)=b
+ (i +1 ,S∪ {i},E,γ)
and (8) holds, i.e.












































































































































j (i +1 ,S,E∪ {i},γ)
by Claim VI(i +1 ),
≤ v
λ (S).
Thus, under these strategies, player 1 proposes ({1},∅,γπ) with γπ (N)=
dπ and the rest of players agree on it. Society is then formed with all the
players and the ﬁnal outcome is dπ.
We now prove that these strategies form a SPNE.
Assume we are in the subgame f M (π,i,S,E,γ) and player i proposes ³
˜ S, ˜ E,˜ γ
´
with j ∈ ˜ S\{i}.
27If some player after player j is bound to vote ‘no’ should turn reach
him, player j is indiﬀerent to voting ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Assume then the oﬀer is
bound to be accepted should player j vote ‘yes’. By doing so, and given
the strategies of the rest of the players, player j gets bj
³
i +1 , ˜ S, ˜ E,˜ γ
´
.B y
rejecting, however, player j gets bj (i +1 ,S,E∪ {i},γ). Thus, it is optimal
for player i to vote ‘yes’ if and only if (10) holds, as prescribed by the strategy
proﬁles.
A s s u m en o ww ea r ei nt h es u b g a m ef M (π,i,S,E,γ). By Claim II, given






i (i +1 ,S,E∪ {i},γ)
¢
.
Assume player i changes his strategy and proposes a diﬀerent
³




i+1. If (10) does not hold for some j ∈ e S\{i},t h i sp l a y e rj will vote ‘no’
and, by Claim V, the ﬁnal payoﬀ for player i is ωi, which is not more than
with the original strategy.
Assume then (10) holds for all j ∈ e S\{i}. The proposal is then accepted
and the ﬁnal payoﬀ for player i is at most bi
³
i +1 , e S, e E,e γ
´
.
We must prove that bi
³













































i +1 , e S, e E,e γ
´


































i (i +1 ,S,E∪ {i},γ)
¢
28and thus player i does not improve his ﬁnal payoﬀ.
F i n a l l y ,a s s u m ew ea r ei nt h es u b g a m eM (π,i,S,E,γ).






i (i +1 ,S,E∪ {i},γ)
¢
(12)
which is not more than what he would get by agreeing. Thus, he will not
improve his ﬁnal payoﬀ by deviating.
If (8) does not hold and player i agrees on (S,E,γ), he will get less than
(12), which is the payoﬀ he obtains by not deviating. Thus, it is optimal for
him to disagree.
5.1.3 Unicity of equilibrium payoﬀs
We now prove that every SPNE in M (π) has dπ as ﬁnal outcome. Assume
w ea r ei na nS P N Eo fM (π).L e tB (π) ⊂ V (N) be the set of ﬁnal payoﬀs
in M (π).W ew i l lp r o v et h a tB (π)={dπ}.
Given i ∈ N and (S,E,γ) ∈ Θπ
i ,l e tB (i,S,E,γ) ⊂ V (N) be the set of
expected SPNE payoﬀsi nt h es u b g a m eM (π,i,S,E,γ).
We proceed by a series of claims. Claim A says that, in equilibrium,
every passive player receives nothing. Claim B gives a suﬃcient condition
for candidates to agree. Claim C speciﬁes the ﬁnal payoﬀ when a candidate
disagrees and makes a new proposal. Claim D says that there is a unique
payoﬀ in equilibrium for any subgame. Claim F says that every candidate
receives at least dπ. Claims E and G are technical ones.
Claim A(n): bE = ωE for all b ∈ B (n,S,E,γ) with (S,E,γ) ∈ Θπ
n.
Proof. Assume we are in the subgame M (π,n,S,E,γ).I f p l a y e r n
agrees (or disagrees and his new proposal is rejected), then the ﬁnal payoﬀ
for players in E is clearly ω. Assume player n disagrees and makes an accept-
able proposal. It is well-known that, in equilibrium, player n would make a
proposal that leaves the responders indiﬀerent to voting ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Since
any responder i ∈ E receives ωi if he votes ‘no’, we conclude the result.
29Claim B(n): Assume we are in M (π,n,Pπ
n,∅,γ) such that γn (N) ≥ dπ
n
and γ ∈ Kπ. Then, player n agrees in equilibrium.
Proof. By agreeing, player n assure himself a payoﬀ of γn (N). Assume
player n disagrees and proposes a diﬀerent e γ. I ft h i sp r o p o s a li sr e j e c t e d ,
player n receives ωn ≤ dπ
n a n dt h u sh ei ss t r i c t l yw o r s eo ﬀ (note the tie-
breaking rule). If the proposal is accepted by players in Pπ
n,t h i sm e a n st h a t
each of them receives at least what they get by rejecting, i.e. e γi (N) ≥ γi (Pπ
n)
for all i<n . Hence, the ﬁnal payoﬀ for player n i sn o tm o r et h a nfπ
n (γ (Pπ
n)).




































and again player n is strictly worse oﬀ.
Claim C(n): Assume we are in f M (π,n,S,E,γ). Then, the only ﬁnal
payoﬀ in equilibrium is given by (t,fπ
n (t)) with t =( γ (S),ω E).
Proof. Since the ﬁnal payoﬀ for any i<n , in case of rejection is ti,f o r
any ε>0 player n can propose (N,∅,e γ) with e γ (N)=( t,fπ
n (t)) + xε,b e i n g
λixε
i = ε for all i<nand λnxε
n = −(n − 1)ε, so that his proposal is always
accepted. Thus, player n can get at least fπ
n (t) in equilibrium. Moreover,
player n cannot get more by doing an acceptable oﬀer, because any player
i ∈ Pπ
n can assure himself a payoﬀ of ti by rejecting any new oﬀer.
Claim D(n): B (n,S,E,γ) is a singleton for any (S,E,γ) ∈ Θπ
n.
Proof. Assume we are in M (π,n,S,E,γ).B yC l a i mC ( n), by rejecting
player n gets a ﬁnal payoﬀ of fπ
n (γ (S),ωE). By the tie-breaking rule, player
n will agree iﬀ fπ
n (γ (S),ω E) ≥ γn (S ∪ {n}). In any case, the ﬁnal payoﬀ is
unique.
Claim E(n): Assume we are in M (π,n,S,E,γ). Then, there exists a
T ⊃ S, E ∩ T = ∅ such that bS = γS (T) for all b ∈ B (n,S,E,γ).
Proof. If player n accepts, then bS = γS (S ∪ {n}).I fp l a y e rn disagrees,
by Claim C(n) we know that bS = γ (S).
30Claim F(n): If b ∈ B (n,S,E,γ) for some (S,E,γ) ∈ Θπ
n,t h e nbn ≥ dπ
n.







































j ≤ vλ(S) for each b ∈ B (n,S,E,γ) with (S,E,γ) ∈
Θπ
n.
Proof. Assume we are in M (π,n,S,E,γ).I f p l a y e r n disagrees, by
Claim C(n)t h eﬁnal payoﬀ b ∈ B (n,S,E,γ) satisﬁes
bPπ











j (S) ≤ v
λ (S).
Moreover, player n gets fπ
n (γ (S),ωE). Thus, if player n agrees, we de-
duce that































b =( γ (S ∪ {n}),ω E).












































Assume now Claims A-G hold for i +1 .N a m e l y ,w eh a v e
Claim A(i +1 ): bE = ωE for all b ∈ B (i +1 ,S,E,γ) with (S,E,γ) ∈
Θπ
i+1.






γj (N) ≥ dπ
j for all j ≥ i +1and γ ∈ Kπ. Then, player i +1agrees in
equilibrium.
Claim C(i +1 ): Assume we are in f M (π,i+1 ,S,E,γ). Then, the ﬁnal







with t = bPπ
i+1 for some
b ∈ B (i +2 ,S,E∪ {i +1 },γ).
Claim D(i+1): B (i +1 ,S,E,γ) is a singleton for any (S,E,γ) ∈ Θπ
i+1.
Claim E(i +1 ): Assume we are in M (π,i+1 ,S,E,γ). Then, there
exists a T ⊃ S, E∩T = ∅ such that bS = γS (T) for all b ∈ B (i +1 ,S,E,γ).
Claim F(i +1 ): If b ∈ B (i +1 ,S,E,γ) for some (S,E,γ) ∈ Θπ
i+1,t h e n
bj ≥ dπ
j for all j ≥ i +1 .




j ≤ vλ (S) for all b ∈ B (i +1 ,S,E,γ) with
(S,E,γ) ∈ Θπ
i+1.
We prove the claims for i<n ,
Claim A(i): bE = ωE for all b ∈ B (i,S,E,γ) with (S,E,γ) ∈ Θπ
i .
Proof. Assume we are in the subgame M (π,i,S,E,γ).I fp l a y e ri agrees
(or he disagrees and his new proposal is rejected), by Claim A(i+1), players
in E get ω. Assume then player i disagrees and makes an acceptable proposal.
It is well-known that, in equilibrium, player i would make a proposal that
32leaves the responders indiﬀerent to voting ‘yes’ or ‘no’. By Claim A(i +1 ),
any responder j ∈ E receives ωj if he votes ‘no’. Thus, we conclude the
result.
Claim B(i): Assume we are in M (π,i,Pπ
i ,∅,γ) such that γj (N) ≥ dπ
j
for all j ≥ i and γ ∈ Kπ. Then, player i agrees in equilibrium.
Proof. The hypothesis of Claim B(i)h o l df o ri +1 ,...,n if player i
agrees. Thus, by induction hypothesis applied to Claim B, we know that
player i gets a payoﬀ of γi (N) by agreeing. Assume player i disagrees and
proposes a diﬀerent e γ.I ft h i sp r o p o s a li sr e j e c t e d ,b yC l a i mA ( i +1 )p l a y e r
i receives ωi ≤ dπ
i and thus he is strictly worse oﬀ (note the tie-breaking
rule). If the proposal is accepted by players in Pπ
i ,t h i sm e a n st h a te a c ho f
them receives at least what they get by rejecting. By Claim E(i +1 ), this
is γPπ
i (T) for some T ⊃ Pπ
i with i/ ∈ T.S i n c eγ ∈ Γπ and i/ ∈ T,w ek n o w
γPπ
i (T)=γ (Pπ
i ). By Claim F(i+1), the ﬁnal payoﬀ for player i is not more
than fπ
i (γ (Pπ















































and again player i is strictly worse oﬀ.
Claim C(i): Assume we are in f M (π,i,S,E,γ). Then, the ﬁnal pay-







with t = bPπ
i for b ∈
B (i +1 ,S,E∪ {i},γ).
Proof. By Claim D(i+1), there exists a unique b in B (i +1 ,S,E∪ {i},γ).
Let t = bPπ















j = ε for all j<i , xε
j =0for all j>i ,a n dλixε
i = −(i − 1)ε.
By induction hypothesis applied to Claim B, we know that this proposal is
bound to be accepted should players in Pπ
i vote ‘yes’. Then, by voting ‘yes’,
players in Pπ
i get something more than what they get by voting ‘no’. Thus,
33they would vote ‘yes’ and player i gets a ﬁnal payoﬀ of almost fπ
i (t).S i n c e
this is true for any ε>0, we conclude that player i can get at least fπ
i (t)
in equilibrium. Moreover, player i cannot get more by doing an acceptable
oﬀer, because any player j ∈ Pπ
i can assure himself a payoﬀ of tj by rejecting
any new oﬀer.
Claim D(i): B (i,S,E,γ) is a singleton for any (S,E,γ) ∈ Θπ
i .
Proof. Assume we are in M (π,i,S,E,γ). By Claim C(i), by reject-






where b is the only payoﬀ in








i,w h e r eb0 is the only payoﬀin B (i +1 ,S∪ {i},E,γ)
(by Claim D(i +1 )). In any case, the ﬁnal payoﬀ is unique.
Claim E(i): Assume we are in M (π,i,S,E,γ). Then, there exists a
T ⊃ S, T ∩ E = ∅ such that bS = γS (T) for all b ∈ B (i,S,E,γ).
Proof. If player i agrees, by Claim E(i +1 ), bS∪{i} = γS∪{i} (T) with
T ⊃ S ∪ {i} (thus T ⊃ S)a n dT ∩ E = ∅. Then, bS = γS (T).
If player i disagrees, by Claim C(i), bS = b0
S where b0 ∈ B (i +1 ,S,E∪ {i},γ).
By Claim E(i +1 ), b0
S = γS (T) with T ⊃ S and T ∩ (E ∪ {i})=∅ (thus
T ∩ E = ∅). Then, bS = γS (T).
Claim F(i): If b ∈ B (i,S,E,γ) for some (S,E,γ) ∈ Θπ
i ,t h e nbj ≥ dπ
j
for all j ≥ i.
Proof. By induction hypothesis applied to Claim F, the result is true for
j>i .L e tb be the only element in B (i +1 ,S,E∪ {i},γ) (Claim D(i+1)).































































34by zero-monotonicity, vλ (S)+
P
j∈E λjωj ≤ vλ(Pπ























j ≤ vλ (S) for all b ∈ B (i,S,E,γ) with (S,E,γ) ∈
Θπ
i .
Proof. Assume we are in M (π,i,S,E,γ). By Claim D, there exists a sin-
gle imputation b in B (i,S,E,γ) and a single imputation ˙ b in B (i +1 ,S,E∪ {i},γ).
If player i disagrees, by Claim C(i), players in Pπ
i get bPπ
i = ˙ bPπ













If player i agrees, then b = ¨ b with¨ b the only imputation in B (i +1 ,S∪ {i},E,γ).






.T h u s ,































































































































35by Claim G(i +1 ),
≤ v
λ (S).
Since, by Claim F, every player i ∈ N can assure himself a ﬁnal payoﬀ of
at least dπ
i ,a n ddπ is an eﬃcient payoﬀ, we conclude that the only possible
ﬁnal payoﬀ in SPNE for the subgame M (π) is dπ and, moreover, the strategy
of player i is robust to deviations by coalitions of Pπ
i .
5.2 Proof of Theorem 3
Note that a zero-monotonic TU game V 0 as given in (1) satisﬁes (A1), (A2),
(A3), and (A4). Furthermore, it is clear that V 0 (N) is delimited by a hyper-
plane whose outward normal vector is given by λi =1for all i ∈ N.
Moreover, property (A5) is only used in the proof of Lemma 1 and in
Lemma 8. However, it is straightforward to prove that Lemma 1 still holds


















for TU games. The rest of the proof is analogous to those of Theorem 2.
5.3 The tie-breaking rule
A more precise description for the strategy of player 4 in Example 7 is the
following: If player 3 was excluded after proposing e γ with e γ1 (N) ≥ e γ2 (N)
and e γ4 (N) ≥ 0,o re γ1 ({1,2,3}) ≥ e γ2 ({1,2,3}) and e γ4 (N) < 0,t h e np l a y e r
4 agrees to join the society. If player 3 was excluded after proposing e γ
with e γ1 (N) < e γ2 (N) and e γ4 (N) ≥ 0,o re γ1 ({1,2,3}) < e γ2 ({1,2,3}) and
e γ4 (N) < 0,t h e np l a y e r4 disagrees and proposes an unacceptable oﬀer, such
like (0,0,0,1).
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